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Public attitudes related to social Europe are important for legitimating the aspirations of 
the European Union and European politicians to deepen European integration. This paper 
investigates public opinion about social Europe by analyzing attitudes related to the basic 
principles for European social security measures and attitudes about implementing a 
uniform European social security system. Based on a survey conducted in 13 European 
countries, it explores the discrepancies between the two interrelated phenomena and 
investigates in detail the factors responsible for the strong support for general principles, 
but fizzling support for the implementation of a European social system. The main 
findings demonstrate that the value-based mechanisms are primarily responsible for 
carrying over the positive attitudes towards the general principles to positive attitudes 
towards a uniform European social security system. In contrast, self-interest does not play 
a prominent role. Left-leaning individuals, emphasizing the justice principle of need and 
who identify and trust the European Union are the primary proponents of general 
principles related to social Europe, as well as for the potential realization of a uniform 
European welfare system. 
  





The European Union and its member states are at crossroads of how to proceed with the 
realization of a social Europe. Social Europe stands for a collection national, transnational, 
and supranational programs, policies, as well as objectives concerned with providing 
solidarity to European citizens (Ferrera 2014, 2017). Essentially social Europe makes social 
concerns of Europeans a common concern of all Europeans by channeling social policy 
topics into EU legislation. From the five components of social Europe Ferrera named, the 
“EU social policy” component2 in particular has received a lot of controversy. Much of the 
debate is about whether soft or hard law-making should be employed for this component. 
So far, employing soft laws has been the dominant approach in the European social 
policy field. Primarily open mechanisms of coordination (OMC) objectives and various 
decrees (e.g. European Pillar of Social Rights) have pushed forward the realization of the 
social policy component of social Europe (de la Porte & Heins 2014; Leibfried 2015). These 
solutions ask for little obligation from member states and let them independently decide 
on tools to achieve the proclaimed tools. In fact, the EU’s commitment to maintain 
national sovereignty looms over developments to further and strengthen European social 
policy because any kind of hard lawmaking in this realm would potentially violate nation 
states’ right for self-governance. It would prod the structure of already existing national 
welfare states. For example, the European Pillar of Social Rights leaves the realization of 
the common goals to national strategies to resolve. It does not force certain programs or 
budgetary obligations on nation states. 
As a result of this status quo in European law making, policy makers have tiptoed 
around the notion of realizing social policy goals with hard lawmaking procedure. 
However, the question of social Europe and harder forms of lawmaking has gained 
visibility in the political arena and recently the topic of EU-wide social policy measures 
are repeatedly on the discussion table (e.g. Macron 2017). Additionally, the scientific 
community has also picked up on the debate. More and more arguments mount to that 
enhancing European integration could be (and should be) done with more hard measures 
and member states should be ready contribute to level the living standards and social 
rights of all Europeans (Andor et al. 2014; Kilpatrick & De Witte 2019). 
If policy makers commit to employing new harder laws for social policy measures on 
a European scale, then their political decisions should be legitimate and backed by the 
                                                 
1 This article refers to a survey (Transnational European Solidarity Survey (TESS)) that was conceptualized 
together with Jürgen Gerhards, Holger Lengfeld, Florian K. Kley and Maximilian Priem (cf. Gerhards et al. 
2019a). This research has been the result of a cooperation of the research project SOLIDUS funded by the 
European Commission in the context of the Horizon 2020 research programme (Grant Agreement No. 
649489), and the research unit Horizontal Europeanization funded by the German Research Foundation 
(DFG) (FOR 1539). 
2 “supranational policies that have an explicit social purpose, be they of a regulative or (re)distributive 
nature, directly funded by the EU budget” ((Ferrera, Maurizio 2017: 47)). 





public’s support. Thus, it is important to understand how the general public feels about 
implementing (hard) measures to realize a social Europe, to introduce schemes connected 
to EU social policy. The current paper sets out to investigate this by focusing on public 
opinion related to EU social policy. It offers a better understanding of what drives 
individuals to support the notion of social Europe. 
Conceptually, Baute and colleagues (2018) recently demonstrated that attitudes 
towards social Europe is a multi-dimensional concept. Such an understanding of attitudes 
corresponds well with Ferrera’s (2014, 2017) theoretical multi-component description of 
social Europe. From the five dimensions Baute and colleagues identified, interpersonal 
solidarity covers attitudes toward European social policy (the same concept has also been 
coined European welfare solidarity (Gerhards et al. 2019a), transnational solidarity 
(Ciornei & Recchi 2017), and supranational solidarity (Díez Medrano et al. 2019)). The 
current paper’s scope covers these attitudes. This paper focuses on the public opinion 
about how strongly do Europeans support social policy measures executed on the 
European level. Other Europeans are the direct recipients of these social schemes. In other 
words, supporting the notion of EU social policy can be understood as the willingness to 
extend solidarity to Europeans living in vulnerable social positions. 
Only a handful of studies focus on the general population’s attitude toward EU social 
policy and they paint a mixed picture (cf. Baute et al. 2018; Vandenbroucke et al. 18 
December, 2018). On the one hand, there is clear indication that the majority of Europeans 
support the notion of European welfare solidarity. There is growing evidence that 
Europeans are willing to help fellow Europeans in need and extend solidarity to those 
living in other European countries (Baute et al. 2018; Baute et al. 2019b; Ferrera & Pellegata 
2019; Gerhards et al. 2016; Vandenbroucke et al. 18 December, 2018; Vision Europe 
Summit Consortium 2015). Newest findings even suggest that Europeans almost 
unanimously support vulnerable Europeans (Gerhards et al. 2019a; Gerhards et al. 2019b). 
On the other hand, Lahusen and Grasso (2018) are more cautious about proclaiming 
unconditional support for solidarity among Europeans, when looking at past actions 
expressing solidarity. Lahusen and Grass (2018) stress that solidarity at the European 
level is not favored by all Europeans and growing Eurosceptic sentiments undermine 
solidarity. Thus, this potentially overshadows European solidarity’s prominence in the 
near future. Others name plain self-interest (both connected to personal and national 
interests) as hurdles for the solidification of European welfare solidarity (Ciornei & Recchi 
2017; Genschel & Hemerijck 2018). Furthermore, some findings also indicate that 
individuals are rather hostile of transferring the competences of the national welfare state 
to the European level, are only ready if there is a certain level of trust present among the 
general public (Hooghe & Verhaegen 2017). Lastly, once the general tone of the inquiry is 
removed, findings point to a lack readiness to support the implementation of a 
supranational (European) social security system (Baute et al. 2018; Gerhards et al. 2016; 
Gerhards et al. 2019a; Meuleman et al. 2018). Overall, there are discrepancies in the results. 




The discrepancies between the empirical results from different research project can 
stem from the variety of the data collection methods employed (including interview and 
data collection methods, representativeness of the samples), but also from the scope of the 
studies and their conceptual realization of the measurement. The measurement of 
attitudes range from generalized attitudes related to the principles of European social 
policy (generalized attitudes) to very concrete policy solutions or social policy schemes 
(policy attitudes). Studies focused more on generalized attitudes, report more positive 
responses related to European solidarity. In contrast, studies tapping policy attitudes 
portray far less support for solidarity. In other words, the support of EU social policy 
fizzles out once it is about concrete policies and not just the general support. 
However, when connecting these observations, there is indication that methodological 
and design related causes are not only responsible for the discrepancies. In studies where 
both types of attitudes have been surveyed (Baute et al. 2018; Gerhards et al. 2019a), the 
gap persists, despite of the data stemming from the same data source for both attitude 
types (from the BNES in 2014 and the TESS in 2016, respectively). This suggests that the 
reasons behind the inconclusive evidence cannot be related solely to methodological 
discrepancies between the studies and could also be related to the substantive reasons 
and mechanisms in the background. 
In spite of systematic differences, studies have not investigated the link between 
generalized attitudes and policy attitudes for this topic, albeit it being important 
information for policy-makers. In fact, both types attitudes of have been rarely discussed 
in the same study and have certainly not been connected. The only exception is the paper 
by Baute and colleagues (2018), where a both generalized attitudes toward European 
welfare solidarity and policy attitudes is tested in a measurement model. In their 
framework, generalized attitudes are referred to as principles of interpersonal solidarity 
and policy attitudes are coined as support for the implementation of European social 
security system (Baute et al. 2018: 360). The authors confirm that generalized and policy 
attitudes both are part of the latent concept “attitudes towards social Europe”. 
Furthermore, they verify that generalized and policy attitudes are two separate 
subdimensions of interpersonal solidarity in their measurement model. The nature of the 
applied method (confirmatory factor analysis), however, is unsuitable to discuss the rift 
between the two subdimensions and the causes of this rift. 
However, no study has explored so far how and when high support rates for principles 
of European solidarity break down and Europeans become divided about the realization 
of social schemes or establishment of institutions adopting the general principles of EU 
social policy. Nonetheless, understanding why positive generalized attitudes fizzle to less 
affirmative (even hostile) policy attitudes could provide important information for public 
policy actors and to ensure the legitimacy of any further political steps to intensify the 
realization of a social Europe. The reasons for the gap between the two types of attitudes 





can be framed as a methodological or as a substantive perspective. This paper focuses on 
the substantive aspect.3 
The current study focuses the relation between generalized and policy attitudes 
towards European social policy. It poses the research question: what influences the 
relationship between generalized and policy attitudes towards European social policy? 
To answer this question the paper explores, what factors are responsible for reported high 
support rates for attitudes towards the principles of European social policy (i.e. 
generalized attitudes), but low support rates for attitudes toward uniform European 
welfare system. Three main groups of factors are discussed, which can be responsible for 
the discrepancies in response rates: (1) self-interest, (2) specific value orientations 
underpinning, (3) relations to the EU (and the nation state). 
The paper continues by describing the theoretical consideration relevant to explain the 
difference between generalized and policy attitudes related to European social policy. It 
describes the potential connections between the two types of attitudes. In the same 
section, the different mechanisms explaining the relationship of generalized and policy 
attitudes are also discussed. Furthermore, hypotheses are also developed to test the 
mechanisms. In the third section of the paper, I discuss the research design and 
methodological steps employed in the analysis. The fourth section reports the results and 
gives account of the empirical finding. In the final section of the paper the results are 
discussed. 
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
2.1. Conceptual framework: the link between the two dimensions 
Generalized and policy attitudes are defined in the following but only conceptually, and 
discussion about the operationalization will be avoided 4. Generalized attitudes toward 
European social policy can be understood as the opinions of individuals related to general 
principles governing European social policy. Such attitudes are typically related to the 
goals of EU social policy or what is the range of EU social policy that should be achieved. 
Generalized attitudes do not capture concrete realizations related to EU social policy. In 
contrast, policy attitudes toward European social policy encompass thoughts of 
individuals about the implementation of concrete social policy schemes on the European 
level. That is, policy attitudes describe what people think of schemes ranging from the 
introduction of basic income schemes, unemployment scheme, EU-wide health insurance, 
to name a few. 
                                                 
3 Readers interested in the methodological perspective should look into literature on survey measurement 
and methodological foundations of measuring attitudes (Aalberg 2003; Eagly & Chaiken [1993] 2011; 
Rokeach 1980, 1968).  
4 For a slightly different categorization for national welfare state attitudes see Toikko and Rantanen (2017). 




To consider the relationship between generalized and policy attitudes toward 
European social policy and on what is this relationship contingent, it is crucial to 
understand both the commonalities they share and the distinct differences that set them 
apart. On the one hand, generalized attitudes and policy attitudes are closely connected 
and are both associated to the broader concept of attitudes towards social Europe. Thus, they 
share the same topic field and are interrelated enough to be discussed together. On the 
other hand, they deal with different subdimensions of interpersonal solidarity (Baute et 
al. 2018). This means that they carry a different meaning for the general public and they 
also cannot be substituted for each other. That is, they are distinct concepts from one 
another. 
As they are distinct concepts, their association to one another needs to be clarified. This 
is a rather ambiguous situation. It is uncertain, whether we can assume a causal 
relationship between the two types of attitudes. On the one hand, generalized attitudes 
serve the basis for policy attitudes (cf. Aalberg 2003). In a broad enough understanding 
of generalized attitudes, they could be stand-ins for value-like concepts and they reflect 
values serving the basis for social Europe. On the other hand, as already noted before, 
generalized and policy attitudes are two subdimensions of the same concept (Baute et al. 
2018). Such evidence suggests that the possible causal relationship between these two 
types of attitudes is unfounded. Exploring the existence of such causal relationship alone 
would give enough material for a paper – but would take away the focus of 
understanding the driving force between these types of attitudes. 
So, instead of examining the existence or lack of a causal relationship and what 
influences this, a different approach is employed in this paper to lead the way out of this 
theoretical conundrum. Ultimately, the empirically observed gap between the two types 
of attitudes drives the further investigation of the relationship. So the prime interest of 
the paper is to understand what factors are responsible for the discrepancy between the 
types of attitudes. 
To investigate this, the paper will utilize a typology, where the two type of attitudes 
(generalized and policy) constitute two separated dimensions and intersected with each 
other. To be exact: accepting or rejecting the notion of Europe social policy from a 
generalized perspective and the perspective of realizing a social policy program are 
intersected to produce in total four categories. Table 1 demonstrates the depiction of the 
typology and shows the categories. 
  










Rejection (A) (B) 
Acceptance (C) (D) 
 
From a policy perspective and to answer our main research question two categories are 
the most interesting: cells (B) and (D). In relation to the legitimacy of any kind of political 
decision regarding the enhancement of social Europe, it is important to understand what 
factors contribute to someone accepting not only the principles related to EU social policy, 
but also supporting the implementation of social policy measure. Additionally, it is just 
as crucial to understand who only agree with the basic principles, but reject the 
implementation of supranational social policy schemes. Lastly, to solve the puzzle of the 
discrepancies observed in the literature, it is important to understand how these two 
groups of individuals differ from each other. 
Thus, the paper’s primary focus will be these two categories. In the following, I will 
recount different factors, which can influence attitudes towards social Europe. I will focus 
on mechanisms, which help shed light on why someone support both principles of EU 
social policy and the implementations of EU social policy. Furthermore, I will also take 
into account factors that could explain the reasons between a respondent falling into 
category (B) versus (D). 
2.2. Explanatory mechanisms 
In the following three mechanisms are discussed and how factors related to these 
mechanisms can potentially affect the support for EU social policy. The three mechanisms 
are: self-interest, value-orientation, and mechanisms connected to transnationalism. The 
hypotheses are formulated for each mechanism in pairs. Hypotheses earmarked with ‘a’ 
address the likelihood that someone will support both generalized and policy attitudes at 
the same time (instead of another constellation), and those with ‘b’ formulate assumptions 
about the odds that someone is willing to support policy attitudes on top of generalized 
attitudes, i.e. these hypotheses help to locate factors responsible for how support 
disappears between generalized attitudes and policy attitudes. 
Several of the explanatory factors for attitudes towards EU social policy is motivated 
by self-interest. The idea is that those who would be direct beneficiaries of EU social policy 
would have the interest to also support it. Due to his mechanism, we can expect that those 
in vulnerable social position, will express higher support rates for the EU social policy. 
While there are arguments stressing that vulnerable individuals fear that the introduction 




of European social policy lead them to turn away from such policies (Berg 2007; Gerhards 
et al. 2016; Mau 2005), this argument has proven to be ungrounded for the large part (for 
an exception see Berg 2007). In fact, studies focusing on generalized attitudes and policy 
attitudes have both found that individuals in lower socio-economic position or with lower 
social status are more likely to support EU social policy (Gerhards et al. 2016; Gerhards et 
al. 2019a; Gerhards et al. 2019b; Mau 2005). This is argument is also supported in the realm 
of national welfare attitudes, where self-interest guides individuals to support social 
policy programs as they would be the main beneficiaries of the system. 
Previous studies have also presented counterarguments and have explained why 
vulnerable individuals would oppose European welfare solidarity. The rationale is that 
self-interest, in fact, leads vulnerable groups to reject European level social policy, because 
they fear that it will mean less benefits for them. However, their empirical findings did 
not support this argument. On the one hand, Berg (2007) using the Swedish SOM study 
from 2004 showed that people from lower occupational classes (i.e. blue collar workers) 
were more likely to support European level social policy than those from higher classes. 
On the other hand, neither Mau (2005) using Eurobarometer data from 2000 nor Gerhards 
et al (2016), with EES data, found indication for a structural divide. 
Given these considerations, I hypothesize that:  
H1a. The lower one’s socio-economic status the higher the probability that they 
acceptance of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy. 
H1b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social 
policy is higher for those in low socio-economic positions than for those is high 
socio-economic position. 
We can further expect that the mechanism of self-interest can also be linked to market 
dynamics (cf. Häusermann et al. 2015). In particular, the double dualization theory of 
European labor markets emphasizes how the vulnerability gap between insiders and 
outsiders is marked (Häusermann & Schwander 2014; Heidenreich 2015; Rueda 2014). On 
the individual level this would mean that if self-interest guides attitudes, then labor 
market position of individuals can influence their beliefs on EU social policy. Insiders of 
labor market have a much more cushioned social position than outsiders and they are also 
less reliant on the welfare state, so they have less interest in the development of EU social 
policy. On the other hand, outsiders in weak labor market positions could benefit from 
furthering EU social policy. Self-interest plays a role, because outsiders of European labor 
markets would not be necessarily the main contributors of EU social policy, but they 
would certainly be the main target groups and recipients of EU welfare benefits. 
Stemming from the nature of the double dualization theory, not only personal interest 
could motivate individuals, but also national interests can serve as the basis for 
individuals to support or oppose EU social policy. Double dualization also emphasizes 
how northern EU countries have more stable labor markets resulting in that citizens of 
these countries have better chances of securing employment for themselves and having 





steady incomes (Heidenreich 2015, 2016). This also means that the vulnerability of those 
living in southern EU member states is higher: the income inequalities are higher and 
should citizens lose their employment in these countries, they are less likely to be 
immediately employed again due to the exclusion mechanisms. Thus, from this follows 
that the interest of citizens in southern European countries dictates that they support EU 
social policy more strongly than those living in northern EU member states. Therefore, 
the following hypotheses can be formulated: 
H2a. Individuals living in southern EU countries have higher probability to accept of 
both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy. 
On top of such direct effects of the self-interest mechanism, it is also worth to consider 
how the vulnerability of individuals in cross-national relativity could play a role in their 
views in EU social policy. Personal and national interests can mount together to influence 
what individuals think about EU social policy. In particular, individuals would strongly 
oppose EU social policy if they are in a vulnerable labor market position and live in 
affluent, prospering countries, where social security systems are of high quality. These 
people are highly reliant on social security – and an introduction of EU social policy could 
mean that the social safety net that they strongly depend on could potentially loosen for 
them. Connected to this, EU social policy would relativize the social position of 
individuals on an EU scale – and with that also the level of vulnerability. This is in contrast 
to national welfare states, where individuals share the burden and the benefits of the EU 
social policy only within their own nation state. Thus, those in more prosperous countries 
but in a nationally vulnerable position may be better off in some case than affluent 
individuals in economically poorer countries. Taking these considerations into account: 
H3a. Individuals with outsider labor market status living in northern EU countries will 
have higher probability to accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards 
EU social policy. 
H3b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social 
policy is lower for those vulnerable individuals living in a northern European 
country. 
Moving on to the next mechanism to influence attitudes towards EU social policy, I 
focus on the how values guide people’s disposition about EU social policy. In general, 
values can be considered the underlying yardsticks for attitudes. Values are often 
regarded as the abstract foundations that anchor attitudes (Hitlin & Piliavin 2004). Thus, 
values underpinning EU social policy are relevant for attitudes for EU social policy. If 
individuals adhere to these underlying values then they should also support the notion 
of EU policy. The current paper differentiates between two value universes: political 
value orientations and justice principles. 
Political value orientations are considered bipolar: individuals can have either left-
wing or right-wing orientations. These value orientations address general principles 




partially also associated with welfare state and welfare provision. In particular, left-wing 
ideology is closely linked historically to redistribution and social policy measures. 
Furthermore, in the political arena the main contenders of EU social policy are also left-
wing politicians (Vesan & Corti 2019). Thus, left-wing ideology could serve as the basis 
for attitudes toward EU social policy. Recent findings have corroborated this mechanism 
in case of general attitudes (Gerhards et al. 2016; Gerhards et al. 2019b), as well as policy 
attitudes (Gerhards et al. 2016). On top of this, the same mechanism is reflected in studies 
focusing on national welfare attitudes: citizens leftist orientations support universalistic, 
redistributive policies, while individuals with right-wing orientation are conservative and 
oppose welfare state provision (Gelissen 2000). 
H4a. The more left-oriented political values individuals have higher probability to 
accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy. 
H4b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social 
policy is higher for more left-oriented individuals. 
On top of the political value orientation, justice principles are also relevant for attitudes 
towards EU social policy. Justice principles constitute citizens’ preferences for a certain 
distributional logic. The justice principle ‘need’ states that share of goods should be 
distributed such that everyone’s basic needs are met. This principles is reflected in the 
general notion of EU social policy. Additionally, the need principle is considered a core 
principle for national welfare states (Arts & Gelissen 2001). Empirically, Gerhards and 
colleagues (Gerhards et al. 2019a; Gerhards et al. 2019b) have identified the need principle 
being positively associated with general attitudes toward EU social policy. Based on these 
considerations, those people who adhere to the need principle are the ones who not only 
support EU social policy in general, but are ready to commit to implementing an EU-wide 
social policy schemes. 
H5a. The more need-oriented individuals have higher probability to accept of both 
generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy. 
H5b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social 
policy is higher for more need-oriented individuals. 
In both cases (political value orientation and justice principles) the commitment to the 
values can influence the effect they have on attitudes. The more strongly a person is 
committed to values support the EU policy, the stronger the mechanism with manifest in 
attitudes. Thus, the intensity of response could mitigate the effect of political value 
orientations and justice principles. 
The last set of factors are related to concepts of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. 
This factor is related to the transnational embeddedness of individuals and their 
connectedness the affairs reaching beyond their nation state. But the character of factors 
is mixed, because the transnationality of individuals can be understood both from a 
structural and cultural perspective. While transnationalism from a structural perspective 





reflects how mobile individuals are across national borders and how connected they are 
internationally, the cultural aspect of transnationalism is related to value and affectual 
underpinnings associated to cosmopolitanism. 
Structurally, those individuals who engage in transnational practices and are less 
confined to national containers, will also have a higher chance to move and make use of 
EU-wide policies and regulations (not only limited to social policy). Transnationally 
connected individuals would be open to measures implemented on the EU level in 
general, because their point of reference is not confined to the nation state due to their 
transnationality. Thus, it is relatively easy to comprehend the notion transnational (or 
supranational) measures for transnationally mobile individuals. 
However, there is also the counterargument related to how transnationality is just 
another marker for being affluent. In fact, those who engage in transnational practices are 
more likely to be affluent in their own country (Delhey et al. 2015; Mau & Mewes 2009). 
Drawing on the self-interest mechanism, individuals who are transnationally well-
connect would have little interest in EU-wide social policies. They already have the ability 
to move around the EU and live where it best fits their interests thanks to the EU right to 
free movement decree (The Treaty of Lisbon 2007). However, there is growing evidence 
that transnational practices foster positive attitudes towards the European Union (Kuhn 
2015). This would suggest that potentially transnational practices potentially also 
promote other aspects connected to European integration. 
H6a. Individuals engaging in more transnational practices are more probable to accept 
both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy. 
H6b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social 
policy is higher for those with higher transnational engagement. 
The cultural aspect of transnationality can also prove to be relevant in shaping attitudes 
toward EU social policy. Recently, cosmopolitanism has been emphasized as a new 
cleavage where cosmopolitans and nationalists line up against each along several aspects 
(Teney et al. 2014; Zürn & Wilde 2016). Given the nature of EU social policy and how it 
breaches national interests and considers the interests of Europeans independent of their 
nationality, the nationalists can be expected to be strong opponents toward EU social 
policy in general. In contrast, those exhibiting strong affectual ties to the EU will also be 
likely to feel solidarity toward other Europeans. This latter argument has been 
demonstrated in a recent publication from Kuhn and colleagues (2017). The coauthors 
demonstrate that cosmopolitanism does play a key role in whether Europeans are ready 
to redistribute income across European boarders. Furthermore, Baute and colleagues 
(2019a) show that identifying with the EU promotes transnational solidarity among 
Europeans. Thus, having primarily sense of connectedness to Europe could boost the 
support for generalized and policy attitudes as well. 




H7a. Individuals identifying with Europe will have more probability to accept of both 
generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy. 
H7b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social 
policy is higher for those identifying with Europe. 
Lastly, the perception of the competences of the executing body of policy measures can 
also play a crucial role for the support of EU social policy. Hooghe and Verhaegen (2017) 
emphasize that EU social policy (but effectively any EU-wide policy with an “intrusive” 
nature) cannot function without the trust of individuals. For individuals to be willing to 
allow measures to be carried over to the EU level – they need to trust the body executing 
the tasks related to these measures. If they lack trust in the EU and its institutions, they 
should be less willing delegate new competences to the EU. While general attitudes 
towards EU social policy do not refer to the executing body of the measures, policy 
attitudes are directly connected with the body implementing the changes. Thus, while we 
can expect that trust in the EU is fosters attitudes towards EU social policy, but more likely 
most relevant for the policy attitudes aspect. 
H8a. Individuals more trusting toward EU institutions will have higher probability to 
accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social policy. 
H8b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social 
policy is higher for those more trusting toward EU institutions. 
Additionally to the high trust for positive attitudes, the performance of national 
governments may also intensify the support for EU social policy. Baute and colleagues 
(Baute et al. 2019b) emphasize the possible spillover effects of trust in national institutions 
being crucial into the trust in institutions on the EU level. If citizens do not feel that their 
government is competent enough, the EU taking over competences may be a welcomed 
alternative. This mechanism can potentially detected at both individual and country level. 
At the individual level, if citizens distrust their government, they potentially also question 
their competences to secure a social safety net. This would lead to them being open to 
transferring competences to the EU level. 
H9a. Individuals less trusting toward their own national government will have a 
higher probability to accept of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU 
social policy. 
H9b. The odds of supporting both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social 
policy is higher for those with less trust in their own national government. 
On the country level, corruption can be a stand-in for lack of institutional trust. 
Therefore the presence of corruption could be potentially be a factor hindering 
individuals to be more open and supportive of EU social policies. The presence of 
corruption in a society indicates the violation of procedural justice norms and the lack of 
transparency related to governmental transfers. The funding from the EU is a significant 
and essential part of national budgets, especially in countries situated more on the 





periphery, or those, which have been more strongly affected by the economic crisis. 
Additionally, funding from the EU is distributed by policy makers on the national level. 
However, if corruption is an issue in a given country, individuals may wish to transfer 
the competences related to EU funding to potentially more trustworthy actor at the EU 
level. From this follows that EU social policy could be seen as best executed also from an 
EU level and individuals will be more supportive of EU social policy, if their governments 
do not ensure the “safe” redistribution of EU funding. 
H10a. Individuals living in countries with high level of corruption will more likely 
exhibit the acceptance of both generalized and policy attitudes towards EU social 
policy. 
Overall, the above stated thoughts hypothesize systematic differences between people 
and the reason why their attitudes toward EU social policy can differ. As the hypotheses 
cover a broad range of topics, should all the above stated hypotheses be rejected, it may 
well be, that there is no structural/cultural background for the difference in attitudes. In 
other words: then no systematic differences could be determined at all. Then the results 
(or rather: the lack thereof) would suggest that the nature of how individuals support 
vague concepts much more easily than a very specific formulation of some sort of 
implementation connected to the same topic. In this case, measurement of the concepts 
would be the sole contender for the perceived discrepancies. 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
To investigate the theoretical assumptions, the empirical analysis uses the Transnational 
European Solidarity Survey (TESS), a unique general population survey stemming from 
primary data collection.5 TESS was carried out in 13 EU countries6 between May and 
November of 2016 with CATI method of telephone interviews (both landline and mobile). 
Respondents were exclusively registered national citizens aged 18 or older at the time of 
the survey. TNS Opinion and Social, the public opinion polling institution that is also 
responsible for the Eurobarometer surveys, carried out the survey. After listwise deletion 
                                                 
 
6 For funding reasons we had to restrict our survey to 13 countries. The survey was carried out in Austria, 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, 
and Sweden. We systematically selected these countries in order to gather the broadest spectrum of EU 
countries. We considered the following aspects: (a) whether a country formerly received or currently 
receives financial aid in relation to the Eurozone crisis; (b) whether the country is a member of the currency 
union or not; (c) to which welfare state regime the country belongs (i.e. liberal, social-democratic, 
conservative, Mediterranean, post-socialist). Additionally, we considered how long they have been 
members of the European Union. We included both founding members of the European Economic 
Community (EEC), as well as relatively young EU Member States. 




of missing values among the variables applied in the analysis, the number of cases 
reached 9,143 respondents. 
TESS is an optimal dataset to test the previously discussed assumptions, because it 
provides items to measure both generalized attitudes and policy attitudes.7 Thus, 
information and data is available to construct the bidimensional typology (see Table 1). 
For the first dimension of the typology (generalized attitudes), four items are available in 
the TESS to measure as four-point Likert-scales: (1) the European Union should guarantee 
access to health care for everyone in the EU, (2) the European Union should guarantee a 
decent standard of living for the elderly in the EU, (3) the European Union should 
guarantee a decent standard of living for the unemployed in the EU, and (4) the European 
Union should reduce income differences between the rich and poor in the EU. For the 
second dimension of the typology (policy attitudes), there is only a single stand-alone 
item with the following wording (Gerhards et al. [unpublished]: 29): “There should be a 
uniform social welfare system for everyone in the EU, even if this leads to an increase in 
taxes and social spending in [COUNTRY].” 
Before constructing the typology, it was ascertained that the two dimensions are not 
only theoretically separate dimensions, but also empirically (see Appendix for details on 
the measurement model). Following this the items were treated to operationalize the 
typology. First, the responses were dichotomized for all items. For the first dimension, 
respondents consenting to all four generalized attitude items (i.e. responding with tend 
to agree or fully agree) were put into one category, while everyone else declining at least 
one were grouped together to another.8 Similarly, for the second dimension respondents 
favoring introducing a European welfare system were in one category, while those 
rejecting the notion were in another category. The four-category typology was then 
formed by intersecting the two dimensions. The categories were the following: (a) 
rejecting both principles and implementation, (b) accepting only principles, (c) accepting 
only implementation, (d) accepting both dimensions. 
To test the hypotheses a set of independent variables were included in the analysis. At 
the individual level, the socio-economic status of individuals were measures by their 
highest level of education (divided into three categories: primary or less, secondary, and 
tertiary), their occupational class based on the EGP class scheme (Evans 1992), and the 
equalized household income divided into deciles for cross-national comparability. The 
TESS dataset lacks variables to well capture insiders and outsiders of the labor market. 
However an attempt is made to divide respondents based on their employment status 
(with categories: fully employed or self-employed, employed part-time, unemployed, 
                                                 
7 For details on the individual distributions of the single items: see (Gerhards, Jürgen et al. 2019a; Gerhards, 
Jürgen et al. 2019b). 
8 Several other versions of the typology were tested, where the cut-off points and constellations of the four 
items we different. The analyses were replicated with the different versions, but the results are. See 
supplement for more details. 





inactive). Two variables captured the mechanisms related to value dispositions. Political 
value orientation was measured by the established index of self-placement on a left-right 
scale (Lo et al. 2013). Preference for the need distributive principle was measured by the 
responses to the statement, “Income should be distributed in a way that ensures 
everyone’s basic needs are met” (Gerhards et al. [unpublished]: 95). For the third 
dimension of mechanisms, transnationalism, several concepts were operationalized. 
Transnational practices captures whether individuals have contact with foreigners or 
whether they themselves have lived abroad as a dummy variable (0 meaning they have 
had some kind of transnational experiences in the past). Identification with one’s own 
nation state and identification with the EU were summarized in a four-category variable 
(1 meaning no identification, 2 only identification with nation state, 3 only with EU, and 
4 identification with both). Lastly, trust in national institutions and EU are also 
hypothesized to be connected to attitudes toward EU social policy. Given again the 
duality and the potentially connectedness of the two items, they were combined into a 
four-category variable (1 meaning no trust in institutions, 2 only trust in nation 
institutions, 3 trusts only EU, and 4 trusts both). Furthermore, I also controlled for number 
of kids in household, age, and gender, as these factors potentially can be connected to self-
interested mechanism. For details on the exact wording of the items, see the TESS 
codebook (Gerhards et al. [unpublished]). To control for contextual affects attributed to 
respondents living in different countries, country dummies were also inserted into the 
analysis. 
  




Table 2 Overview of descriptive statistics for independent variables 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Age 54.05 16.38 18 97 
Number of kids in household 0.36 0.77 0 8 
Female(ref.: male) 0.54 --- 0 1 
Level of education     
Tertiary 0.39 --- 0 1 
Secondary 0.57 --- 0 1 
Primary or lower 0.04 --- 0 1 
EGP-Class     
Upper class (I) 0.22 --- 0 1 
Upper middle class (II) 0.16 --- 0 1 
Center middle class (IIIa) 0.17 --- 0 1 
Lower middle class (V & VI) 0.12 --- 0 1 
Self-employed (IVab & IVc) 0.05 --- 0 1 
Routine non-manual (IIIb) 0.17 --- 0 1 
Unskilled manual workers & agriculture (VIIa 
& VIIb) 
0.06 --- 0 1 
EGP-Class n.a. 0.04 --- 0 1 
Income 5.56 2.84 1 10 
Employment status     
Full-time or self-employed 0.44 --- 0 1 
Part-time employed 0.08 --- 0 1 
Unemployed 0.06 --- 0 1 
Inactive 0.43 --- 0 1 
Political value orientation     
Center 0.34 --- 0 1 
Far Left 0.1 --- 0 1 
Moderate Left 0.22 --- 0 1 
Moderate Right 0.25 --- 0 1 
Far Right 0.09 --- 0 1 
Preference of Need Justice Principle 3.63 0.66 1 4 
Experience with cross-border practices(ref.: none) 0.66 --- 0 1 
Identity     
Identifies with Both 0.75 --- 0 1 
Identifies with None 0.02 --- 0 1 
Identifies with (Only) EU 0.03 --- 0 1 
Identifies with (Only) Nation 0.2 --- 0 1 
Level of trust     
Trusts Both 0.28 --- 0 1 
Trusts None 0.39 --- 0 1 
Trusts (Only) EU 0.16 --- 0 1 
Trusts (Only) Nation 0.17 --- 0 1 
 
Additionally, two hypotheses also addressed country-level mechanisms, so several 
macro level variables related to these hypotheses were also incorporated into the analysis. 
In particular, the prosperity of countries is measured by a set of macro-economic and 
inequality indicators: GDP per capita, unemployment rate, level of income inequality. For 





an indicator for corruption, the corruption perception index (CPI) from Transparency 
International (Transparency International 2015). 
Given the nominal measurement level of the typology, multinomial logistic regression 
(MNL) was employed. MNL is from the family of general linear models, where the 
dependent variable is nominal. MNL can be considered a set of binary logistic models, 
where each of the categories of the dependent variables are compared to one another. 
MNL models are estimated with maximum likelihood estimation and the main value for 
the fit of the model is the likelihood value of the model. MNL can be seen as a probability 
model, in the sense that the coefficients of the model express the probability of 
respondents falling into a specific category compared to the chosen reference category 
(Long 1997). These probabilities are dependent on the explanatory variables in the model. 
MNL can be used in both bivariate and multivariate cases. For this paper, MNL is the 
main method to understand what are the main factors influencing the way individuals 
think about European welfare solidarity.9 
The majority of the hypotheses focus on individual level mechanisms. So the first set 
of models the individual level variables are inserted step-by-step based on their thematic 
focus. Given the number of countries (N=13), the analysis does not apply hierarchical 
modelling, but instead operates with clustered standard errors and controls for country 
contextual effects with country dummies. In case of the analysis focusing macro level 
effects, a two-step approach is undertaken where the tau values of the country dummies 
are contrasted with the macro level variables described previously. Analyses were 
conducted in Stata (version 15) and in R (version 3.5.3). 
4. ANALYSIS 
4.1. Overview of the typology 
The descriptive statistics shows that respondents are spread out across all four categories 
of the typology (see Table 3, for overview). A large percentage of respondents support 
both the general principles of EU social policy, as well as its institutionalization. However, 
the rate does not reach half of the sample size – so we cannot talk about absolute majority 
standing headstrong behind both generalized and policy attitudes. In contrast, a lower 
rate of respondents are against the institutionalization, but support the general principles. 
This rate is about half the rate of respondents with positive general and policy attitudes. 
Similar amount of respondents are against European welfare solidarity in general and 
support neither general principles nor institutionalization. In total, this makes up about 
one fifth of all respondents. Lastly, the fourth category also has considerable number of 
                                                 
9 To check the robustness of the results, logistic regression was also conducted for the two typology 
categories with theoretical relevance. However, to empirically correctly model the four-fold typology, 
employing a multinomial logistic regression is more accurate. 




respondents. In this category are those, who support institutionalization, but do not agree 
with general principles underlying them.10  
 





Rejection 20.4% 19.6% 
Acceptance 14% 45.6% 
 
If we would look at any of the alternative operationalizations, where the typology 
would only consider one of the subdimension of general principles (social security or 
redistribution), the division among the respondents would be similar. The rate of those 
supporting institutionalization of EU social policy and redistributive principles or social 
security wobbles around 50%. By such an operationalization you have few individuals 
with negative general and policy attitudes (13% and 15%, respectively), and the rate of 
individuals only supporting general principles is higher (30% and 24% respectively). 
Given the comparability of the different operationalizations the subsequent analysis 
will only focus on the typology that incorporates both subdimensions of principles. When 
the analysis was conducted for typologies only incorporating one of the subdimensions, 
the effects were, in fact, more pronounced. In the following, the mechanisms influencing 
individuals to fall in a certain typology category will be investigated. Given the focus of 
the theoretical framework, we are most interested in understanding what influences the 
chances of someone supporting the general principles of EU social policy and its 
institutionalization in form of a European social security system. Second topic of interest 
is the odds that someone will positively support both general principles and policy 
measures compared to those only supporting the general principles. The former is 
investigated by predicted probabilities, while the latter can be best understood with odds 
ratios (OR). 
4.2. The relevance of self-interest 
A look at the Wald-test shows that variables capturing the self-interest exhibit mixed 
effects. Level of education, occupation, and employment status have little to no effect on 
                                                 
10 These individuals represent a special subgroup, where it is not clear why they support more restrictive 
measures but not general aspects of EU social policy. On the one hand, it could be an indication that indeed 
general and policy attitudes are not causally related. But we, furthermore, cannot exclude the possibility 
that respondents misunderstood the question and their sole support for institutionalization is an artefact. 
Within the framework of the study, however, there is no means to investigate this question further. 





attitudes towards EU social policy. On the other hand, income has an exceptionally strong 
effect based on the value of the Wald-test. The slopes of the predicted probabilities also 
reflect the effect of income. The higher the household income of an individual, the less 
likely will he or she support general principles of the European welfare state solidarity 
and the introduction of a uniform social security simultaneously. However, the actually 
impact of income when looking at predicted probabilities is moderate: a hypothetical 
individual in the lowest decile have about 7 percentage point higher probability to 
support EU social policy compared to those from households in the highest income decile. 
On top of the significant effect of income, gender also proved to be significant for attitudes 
towards EU social policy. While gender, is not a direct measure of weaker socioeconomic 
status, the labor market position of women is considered more vulnerable than that of 
men (Addabbo et al. 2015; Castellano & Rocca 2019). Thus, the social position of women 
are also reflected in our results: women more likely support the principles and the 
institutionalization of EU social policy than men. 
When focusing solely on the factors relevant for the cut-off between the support for 
general principles and institutionalization, the results shed further light on the 
mechanisms at large. Income and gender pay a less prominent role than before (the 
coefficient is only significant when not controlled by other relevant factors in the realm of 
values and transnationalism), while occupation and level of education seem to matter for 
the divide between the two categories of interest. The odds that someone will support not 
only general principles but also the institutionalization of EU social policies decreases if 
they have a secondary education instead of tertiary. Those in lower occupational classes 
have higher odds to support only the general principles of EU social policy but the not 
institutionalization. 
Lastly, the macro level analysis conducted with a two-step regression reveal that 
national self-interest can motivate attitudes. There is a higher percent of respondent 
supporting both the general principles and the institutionalization in countries, which are 
less prosperous and have high levels of (net) income inequality. Also corresponding to 
the arguments in previous section, the data shows that in southern EU member states, the 
predicted probabilities are significantly higher than in Western or Eastern member states. 





Figure 1  The effect of unemployment rate and income inequality on the predicted 
probability that identification and institutional trust on attitudes towards social Europe 
All in all, the results shows that the mechanism of self-interest only has a moderate 
effect on attitudes towards social policy and in fact does not motivate individuals to 
transfer their general attitudes toward policy attitudes. While the general tendency is true 
that the more likely you might rely on social policy in general due to your socioeconomic 
position, the more likely they support both the general principles and the 
institutionalization of EU social policy. However, the data indicates that people in lower 
occupational classes are less likely to go the extra mile for the institutionalization of the 
EU social policy. 
4.3. The relevance of values 
In contrast to socioeconomic position, indicators associated to values and also 
transnational have clearer and stronger effects. Both self-placement on a left-right scale as 
well as the preference for the need justice principles show a clear association with 
attitudes toward EU social policy. Individuals placing themselves on the far-left or 
moderate left side of the scale have more than 10 percentage points higher probability to 
be in the category where general principles and policy implementation is both supported 
than those in the center of the political scale, and close 20 percentage points higher 
probability than those at the right end of the political self-placement scale. The relevance 
of the need principle preference is also demonstrated by the analysis. Those respondents 
who have a strong preference for the need principle are four-fold more likely to have 
supportive attitudes towards the general principles and the actual institutionalization of 
EU social policy if holding everything else on average values. 
Both left-right placement, as well as preference for the need principle are also relevant 
when investigating whether the value disposition of respondents motivate their attitudes 





between general and policy attitudes. The odds increase of choosing also the 
institutionalization of EU social policy if someone in left-leaning (compared to those in 
the center field). In contrast, respondents placing themselves on the right end of the 
political scale are not significantly different from respondents in the center. Preferences 
towards the need principle also increase the chances of choosing not only the general 
principles of EU social policy, but also supporting its institutionalization. All in all, there 
is indication that attitudes towards EU social policy are rooted in value orientation of 
individuals. 
  
Figure 2   Predicted probabilities for the effect of value orientation on attitudes 
towards social Europe 
4.4. The relevance of transnationality 
Lastly, the analysis also investigates whether various transnational aspects of respondents 
attributes were also associated with their attitudes towards EU social policy. The Wald-
test yielded that while the transnational practices are only marginally relevant for 
attitudes towards EU social policy, identity and institutional trust play a role in shaping 
attitudes. A look at predicted probabilities shows that in case of identity, the crucial aspect 
is whether individuals exclusively identify with only their nation state. These individuals 
have in average 15 percentage point less chance to support EU social policy than anyone 
who identifies (also) with the EU and even among those who do not identify with either 
the EU nor their own nation state. Trust in the national government and EU institutions 
also is relevant for attitudes towards EU social policy. Someone exhibiting institutional 
trust on the national and the EU level will have the highest probability to support the 
general principles and the institutionalization of EU social policy. On average this is 
significantly higher than those have only trust in their own government and also those 
lacking institutional trust at both spatial levels. A complementary finding on the macro 




level is, that in countries, where the corruption perception index is low (i.e. there is higher 
levels of corruption reported), the predicted probabilities for preferring both general 
principles and the institutionalization of EU social policy are higher. However, the 
connection is not particularly strong. 
When focusing on the odds for individuals to only support general principles instead 
of both principles and the institutionalization of EU social policy, the results mirror the 
effects discussed on the previous paragraph. The odds are significantly lower for someone 
to support both types of attitudes, if respondents have exclusively a national identity. In 
case of trust, the picture is much more nuanced. The support of both dimensions of 
attitudes of EU policy (in contrast to only general principles) is contingent on both the 
trust in national and EU governments. In all other cases (when only trusting institutions 
at one of the spatial level or none at all), the odds are higher for individuals only to 
support the general principles of EU social policy and not its institutionalization. Thus, 
these results indicate that it is not enough for individuals to be disillusioned by their own 
government to then be open to organize a social safety net at the European level, but the 
trust in the EU institutions is also indispensable. All in all, the results indicate that trust 
and identity foster attitudes toward EU social policy. 
  






Figure 3  Predicted probabilities for the effect of identification and institutional trust 
on attitudes towards social Europe 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study set out to understand what factors influencing attitudes towards EU social 
policy. It had a unique approach in conceptualizing and connecting generalized and 
policy attitudes. It developed a typology to analyze the connection between these two 
types of attitudes and the factors, relevant for them. Three main individual level 
mechanisms were hypothesized to be relevant: self-interest, value-related and 
transnationalism. Survey data from the TESS dataset were applied to the analysis. 
The results clearly show that there are systematic differences between individuals who 
are willing to go “all in” for the realization of a stronger social Europe. The divide is 
strongly of cultural nature, so filling structural differences. While hypotheses reflecting 
the self-interest mechanisms were to a large degree rejected, the analysis supported 
hypotheses addressing mechanisms related to value disposition and as transnationalism 
proved to be relevant for attitudes. Thus, findings of this paper reflect on recent findings 
from Lahusen and Grasso (2018), who emphasize how Euroscepticism is one of the main 
obstacles undermining the strengthening of European solidarity. 
The probability of individuals to support both the generalized and policy attitudes 
decrease as the household income of individuals increased. Only H3 relating to macro 
level manifestation of self-interest can be contended: in countries with negative GDP 
growth rates and with high levels of unemployment rate are more likely to support both 
general principle of social Europe individuals support to a larger degree both principles 
and policies related to social Europe. In contrast, results overwhelmingly support 
hypotheses aimed at testing the relationship between attitudes and cultural mechanisms. 




Those having a leftist political orientation and subscribing to the need principle push 
individuals are more likely to support generalized and policy attitudes at the same time. 
Such results are not all that surprising, considering how the operationalization of self-
interest does not stem from attitudes, whereas the value are much closer related to 
attitudes. Thus, the analysis lacks items where respondent reflect on their own economic 
and social standing. So the low effects can be partially attributed to this. Another 
limitation of the paper is that it has not (could not) clear up, whether respondent in this 
latter category are merely an artefact due to measurement and operationalization issues, 
or such response patterns are related to the competences of respondents. Such issues can 
be addressed where better measurement tools are available and research agendas are 
specialized for these specific issues. In particularly, to understand the connection between 
general and policy attitudes, panel analysis and even experimental design research 
designs would make substantive contribution to our understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, given that some systematic differentiation among 
respondents could be identified, this indicates that typology was not completely at 
random. Furthermore, since level of education and other structural factors were weak,  
Ultimately, this current paper could only scratch the surface of the issues surround 
social Europe. It provides some basic observations related to the relation between 
generalized and policy attitudes. It lacks a methodological approach (due to the nature of 
the available data) of understanding the psychometric mechanism underlying these two 
types of attitudes. Furthermore, the scope of the paper also ignored the mechanisms 
associated with individuals lacking any commitment to the notion of social Europe, as 
well as those who reject the principles of social Europe, but nonetheless welcome the 
implementation of a uniform European social welfare system. 
From an applied perspective this analysis has contributed to understanding whether 
there are any social groups emerging who potentially can push forward the realization of 
a European welfare state in the European Union. Or on the flip side: whether there are 
any social groups who particularly have the potential to hinder the development of a 
welfare state that provides a safety net for all Europeans. The results clearly indicate that 
European integration and the realization of a social Europe is not contingent on the action 
of structural interest groups. Instead, the support seems to be value-driven, with a touch 
of pragmatism about trusting institutions: social Europe is not an alternative to national 
welfare systems, but is rather a viable rather as an add-on only if EU as a supranational 
organization has solidified and gained a certain level of credibility. Looking at this 
connection from another perspective: the deepening of social Europe should not be the 
sole driver of European integration. 
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8. APPENDIX 
Table 4   Measurement model  
Indicators Factor loadings 
[EU] should guarantee access to health care  in the EU 0.701 0.623 
[EU] should guarantee a decent standard of living for the elderly in the EU 0.784 0.754 
[EU] should guarantee a decent standard of living for the unemployed in the EU 0.735 0.666 
[EU] should reduce income differences between the rich and poor in the EU 0.662 0.584 
Uniform social welfare system for everyone in the EU 0.394 - 
CFI 0.992 0.996 
RMSEA 0.015 0.011 
AIC 103709.561 78646.118 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N= 8 922. Confirmatory factor analysis. Standardized factor loadings and 
fit-indices. 
Notes: + p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 5    Macro level effects on predicted probabilities for supporting 
general principles and institutionalization of social Europe 
Macro variables   
GDP per capita (in 1000 USD) -0.512+  
Government social spending (percent of GDP) -0.388  
Poverty Rate (percent) 0.685*  
Income inequality (Gini index) 2.335***  
GDP growth rate (percent) -0.558**  
Unemployment Growth Rate (2008-2015), % 1.439**  
Southern Europe 19.701***  




Corruption perception index -0.41*  
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N=13. Bivariate OLS regression with predicted 
probabilities for each country from M6 pooled regression as dependent variable and 
macro level indicator as independent variables with country clustered robust 
standard errors 
Notes: + p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
Table 6    Macro level effects on predicted probabilities for supporting 
only general principles related to social Europe 
Macro variables   
GDP per capita (in 1000 USD) 0.01  
Government social spending (percent of GDP) 0.034  
Poverty rate (percent) 0.194*  
Income inequality (Gini index) 0.08  
GDP growth rate (percent) -0.157*  
Unemployment growth rate (2008-2015), % 0.211  
Southern Europe 1.251  
Corruption perception index -0.062  
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N=13. Bivariate OLS regression with predicted 
probabilities for each country from M6 pooled regression as dependent variable and 
macro level indicator as independent variables with country clustered robust 
standard errors 
Notes: + p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 




Table 7  Odds ratios for supporting only generalized principles versus support both generalized principles and 
implementation of a European social security system 
 M1 M2 
Sex (Ref.: Male)  0.974 
[1] Non- or primary  1.080 
[2] Secondary  1.066 
[3] Tertiary  (ref.) 
[1] Upper class (I)  (ref.) 
[2] Upper middle class (II)  1.044 
[3] Center middle class 
(IIIa) 
 0.783* 
[4] Lower middle class (V & 
VI) 
 0.933 
[5] Self-employed (IVab & 
IVc) 
 0.852 
[6] Routine non-manual 
(IIIb) 
 0.992 
[7] Unskilled manual 
workers & agriculture (VIIa 
& VIIb) 
 0.722 
deciles  1.011 
[1] Full-time or self-
employed 
 (ref.) 
[2] Part-time employed  0.835 
[3] Unemployed  1.028 
[4] Inactive  0.943 
[1] Left  1.371** 
[2] Moderate Left  1.503** 




[3] Center  (ref.) 
[4] Moderate Right  0.883 
[5] Right  0.907 
Justice: Basic needs (mis.)  1.309** 
  




 M1 M2 
[0] Identifies with neither  1.017 
[1] (Only) EU  1.537* 
[10] (Only) National  0.619*** 
[11] Identifies with both  (ref.) 
[0] Trusts neither  0.544*** 
[1] Trusts (Only) EU  0.783** 
[10] Trusts (Only) National  0.547*** 
[11] Trusts both  (ref.) 
Trust: European Union 
(mis., rev.) 
  
No engagement  1 
Some engagement  1.094 
Age in 10 years 1.140*** 1.135*** 
Household: Number of 
kids 
0.994 1.000 
Netherlands 1.220*** 1.521*** 
Germany 1 1 
Spain 2.651*** 2.929*** 
Poland 1.558*** 2.006*** 
Sweden 1.609*** 2.082*** 
Greece 0.905*** 1.406*** 
Hungary 1.460*** 1.871*** 
Austria 0.777*** 0.863*** 
Republic of Cyprus 1.262*** 1.886*** 
Ireland 1.214*** 1.541*** 
Portugal 1.766*** 2.048*** 
Slovakia 1.006 1.198*** 




France 1.339*** 1.798*** 
Observations 9143 9143 
R2   
AIC 22580.7 21348.2 
Exponentiated coefficients 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
